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BOOK REVIEWS
WHAT DOES CHINA WANT?
Heath, Timothy� China’s New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of Na-
tional Rejuvenation. Farnham, Surrey, U�K�: Ashgate, 2014� 256pp� $109�95
In 2012, Tim Heath, then an analyst 
at U�S� Pacific Command, published a 
scholarly article that considered whether 
in fact China had a national strategy 
(“What Does China Want? Discerning 
the PRC’s National Strategy,” Asian Secu-
rity 8, no� 1 [2012], pp� 54–72)� Draw-
ing extensively from Chinese sources, 
Heath argued that China did not have 
a formal national strategy document 
but did outline the essential elements 
of a national strategy in the authorita-
tive writings of the Chinese Communist 
Party� Among professionals working 
Pacific security issues, the article was 
widely discussed and well regarded� 
In China’s New Governing Party Para-
digm, Tim Heath expands and broad-
ens this theme, examining the central 
narrative that both provides internal 
justification for exclusive Chinese 
Communist Party rule and shapes the 
policies the party imposes on China� 
Along the way, he offers a detailed 
description of the mechanisms the 
party employs to study, develop, and 
communicate the essential decisions 
that literally form the “party line�”
Up until the 1980s, academic studies 
of the People’s Republic of China often 
focused on ideology, revolution, and 
the impact of the Communist Party and 
party struggles� In the years since Deng 
Xiaoping announced the “reform and 
opening up” that freed China’s economic 
potential, analysts have focused on the 
impact of this economic change and 
the social forces it unleashed� In many 
cases, these studies portray the party 
as having abandoned ideology, offering 
the Chinese people national prestige 
and economic prosperity in its place�
Heath suggests that party ideology was 
not abandoned but transformed to 
ensure the party’s continued relevance 
and claim to authority� The key change 
came in 2002 when an authoritative 
official report referred to the Com-
munist Party as the “governing party�” 
Though largely unremarked on at 
the time, this pronouncement repre-
sented a formal abandonment of the 
“revolutionary party” ideology that had 
justified party rule since the founda-
tion of the People’s Republic in 1949� 
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While governments universally claim 
that they can govern competently, Heath 
underscores the exclusivity of the party’s 
claim: not merely that it can rule well, 
but that it is uniquely equipped through 
rigorous study and discovery of natural 
laws to rule well� In Heath’s words, the 
party asserts that “no other political 
group possesses an intellectual grasp of 
the historic natural laws underpinning 
China’s development�” The exclusivity of 
this claim means that ideology, far from 
being dead, is of central importance in 
justifying the party’s rule� The party’s 
grasp is expressed in correct theory 
that, promulgated by the party, becomes 
the basis for central directives that 
then are expressed in laws and policy� 
Party theory is broad and elastic, set-
ting a central direction and allowing 
increasingly professional bureaucra-
cies to develop more-detailed guidance 
that aligns with the party line� The shift 
to a “governing party paradigm” has 
caused the party to focus on formalizing, 
regularizing, and bounding this process 
of policy interpretation� This interpreta-
tion process allows ministries and lower 
levels of government some genuine 
latitude in decision making within the 
overall guidance� This is, however, “rule 
of law” in the Chinese rather than West-
ern sense� The absolute demand that 
law conform to party guidance renders 
any move toward independent author-
ity, either bureaucratic or democratic, a 
threat to party rule, and transgressions 
of party guidance are quickly sup-
pressed via an enforcement process that, 
to Western eyes, appears extralegal� 
Much of the book describes the bu-
reaucratic structure that develops, 
reviews, and issues party guidance� 
Heath emphasizes the key role of the 
Central Party School in this process� 
The two most recent general secretar-
ies of the Communist Party, Hu Jintao 
and Xi Jinping, previously served as 
Central Party School presidents� They 
have relied on the school, its staff, and its 
students as both a think tank and a key 
means of promulgating their guidance�
For readers interested in national se-
curity, Heath’s analysis raises a number 
of essential issues� The party’s claim to 
unique competency means that its legiti-
macy is in large part performance based� 
While the concept of “performance 
legitimacy” in the Chinese system is not 
new, Heath underscores how critical it 
is that the party be able to present itself 
as successful, or at least competent, in 
every key policy area� In this context, it 
is clear why Xi Jinping views endemic 
corruption as a key threat to party rule�
Further, Heath’s analysis has impor-
tant implications for the future of the 
Chinese military� The People’s Libera-
tion Army (PLA) has a unique relation-
ship with the party� It is, of course, the 
party’s army, first and last accountable 
to the party leadership� It too, however, 
has been impacted by the tendency to 
delegate execution-level detail to profes-
sional bureaucracies� Heath’s model 
suggests that PLA leaders, as technical 
experts in their field, will expect to enjoy 
increasing influence and autonomy 
within their area of expertise� The party, 
however, is especially sensitive to its 
control of the military, and the tension 
in this relationship that Heath identifies 
will likely continue in coming years�
This is a dense, specialized book, and 
the generalist would do well to start 
with a work such as Richard Mc-
Gregor’s excellent The Party: The Secret 
World of China’s Communist Rulers 
(2012) as an introduction to the topic� 
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However, the work is approachable 
to the motivated reader and for the 
Navy’s growing cadre of Asia-Pacific 
hands represents essential reading� 
DALE C� RIELAGE 
Serrat, Austin, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha 
Merrill Umphrey, eds� Law and War� Stanford, 
Calif�: Stanford Univ� Press, 2014� 248pp� $75
Law and War is a collection of five essays 
on the role of law in war offered as part 
of the Amherst Series in Law, Jurispru-
dence, and Social Thought� What ties the 
essays together is their shared interest in 
“interrogating the assumption � � � that 
the insertion of law into war is necessar-
ily a salutary achievement�” But this con-
nection is often loose, and, while several 
of the essays have a great deal of indi-
vidual merit, it is perhaps a weakness 
of the book that it lacks the degree of 
overall coherence that one might expect�
Sarah Sewell leads off with the essay 
most relevant to military legal practi-
tioners and warfighters� In “Limits of 
Law: Promoting Humanity in Armed 
Conflict,” Sewell makes a compelling 
argument that modern norms about 
what is acceptable in war often outstrip 
the limits imposed by the actual law; 
that is, norms often make “unacceptable” 
conduct that the law inarguably still 
permits� She views this as a negative de-
velopment, fearing that as gaps develop 
between the norms and the law, it will 
increasingly erode respect for the latter� 
By way of example, Sewell highlights 
the growing normative expectation that 
powerful states will eliminate civilian 
casualties in war, while the law of armed 
conflict has always recognized an uneasy 
balance between humanitarian protec-
tion and military necessity—a balance 
that “the norm of minimizing civilian 
casualties” does not need to maintain� 
Gabriella Blum follows Sewell, and in 
“The Individualization of War” she 
explains how such norms have taken 
hold through a process she describes 
as a shift from “collectivism” to “cos-
mopolitanism,” by which she means 
a shift from a “state-centered set of 
obligations” to one focusing on the 
rights of individuals to be protected 
from the evils of war� Like Sewell, Blum 
asserts that this development is not 
necessarily good, leading to an increas-
ing conflation between the norms of 
policing and those of warfighting (with 
negative consequences to both)�
The third essay represents a substan-
tive, if not thematic, departure, as Laura 
Donohue writes on “Pandemic Disease, 
Biological Weapons, and War�” Dono-
hue offers a historical treatment of U�S� 
federal authority for responding to such 
threats, and argues that post-9/11 fears 
have led to a paradigm shift in think-
ing about them—from public health 
menace to national security threat� 
This essay is probably most relevant 
to military practitioners dealing with 
domestic support to civil authorities�
Samuel Moyn’s essay “From Antiwar 
Politics to Antitorture Politics” offers 
a fascinating comparison between the 
legal arguments offered against the 
Vietnam War and those often presented 
regarding America’s conduct of its 
post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan� 
Through a careful examination of the 
role of law in the antiwar movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s, Moyn highlights 
the extent to which the debate centered 
on the legality of America’s entry into 
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the conflict, as opposed to focusing 
on how America fought� Moyn then 
traces a shift toward the end of the war, 
particularly Telford Taylor’s trenchant 
criticism of American warfighting 
practices, which Taylor came to view 
as unlawful� By contrast, Moyn argues 
that criticism of our modern conflicts is 
directed at the conduct of hostilities—
torture, rules of engagement, and war 
crimes� He ascribes this to the end of 
conscription and the relative inoculation 
of much of the American public from 
the effects of our wars abroad, but also 
to a larger shift in the broad discourse 
about the law of war in the modern era, 
in which the means and methods of 
warfare are much more tightly regulated� 
The final essay builds to some extent on 
Moyn’s work, though Larry May’s “War 
Crimes Trials during and after War” is 
less cogent and ultimately less valu-
able� May sets out to examine whether 
war crimes trials are best prosecuted 
while hostilities are still under way or 
after hostilities are concluded� Contro-
versially, May argues that war crimes 
trials during hostilities ought to address 
jus ad bellum matters: once a tribunal 
finds that unlawful “aggressive war” is 
being waged, soldiers of that side are 
on notice that they may be participants 
in the war crime of aggression� This 
strikes the reviewer as highly implau-
sible, and for that reason this essay 
is perhaps the weakest of the five�
Ultimately, Law and War is a collec-
tion of essays that are largely concep-
tual and highly normative in their 
arguments� As such it is undoubtedly 
a thought-provoking and challenging 
book, but also one that is not likely to 
be of immediate use to military lawyers 
per se� On the other hand, for non-
lawyers who ponder the role of law in 
war, in policy making, and in shap-
ing and reflecting societal norms, the 
book offers many valuable insights�
JOHN MERRIAM
Daddis, Gregory� Westmoreland’s War: Reassess-
ing American Strategy in Vietnam� Oxford, U�K�: 
Oxford Univ� Press, 2015� 320pp� $36�95
General William Westmoreland, the 
American commander of Military As-
sistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 
from 1964 through 1968, remains one of 
the most contentious personalities of the 
Vietnam War, still the subject of intense 
debate among veterans and historians 
of the war� Prevalent still is the view 
that “Westy” could not see the forest for 
the trees, or vice versa, and disastrously 
lacked strategic vision and operational 
creativity owing to his parochial focus 
on employing Cold War “big unit” 
doctrine and attrition to combat an 
insurgent war of unification� The most 
extreme of such assessments of West-
moreland comes from Lewis Sorley, who 
in multiple works, notably Westmore-
land: The General Who Lost Vietnam 
(Houghton Mifflin, 2011), all but charges 
Westmoreland with gross negligence� 
Gregory Daddis, formerly of the Military 
History Department at West Point and 
now associate professor of history at 
Chapman University, offers what he 
believes is a more balanced view of this 
controversial general� In Westmore-
land’s War, Daddis argues that instead 
of lacking understanding of the con-
flict in Vietnam and warmly wrapping 
himself in the comfort of familiar “big 
unit” doctrine, Westmoreland em-
braced counterinsurgency approaches 
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and pacification, strongly supported 
building up the Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam (ARVN), and recognized 
the importance of establishing the 
political legitimacy of the government 
of the Republic of Vietnam among the 
South Vietnamese people� Far from 
the bumbling, career-climbing marti-
net characterized by Sorley, Daddis’s 
Westmoreland at least asserted an intel-
lectual understanding of the challenges 
of revolutionary warfare� Daddis argues 
that West moreland recognized the need 
for pacification and other counterinsur-
gency measures, but failed to articulate 
his strategy publicly or to his command-
ers in the field, ending up conducting 
what was in essence an unwinnable war�
Daddis offers a challenging corrective on 
Westmoreland, but some will find that 
his ideas fall a bit short� What West-
moreland said and wrote, which Daddis 
ably reveals through his extensive and 
valuable archival research, does not con-
nect to what happened on the battlefield� 
Westmoreland could not militarily rec-
tify the political problems of South Viet-
nam, and, as both the military and polit-
ical situations continued to deteriorate, 
Westmoreland in turn relied more on 
big-unit search and destroy operations 
and the massive firepower the American 
military had at its disposal� The military 
situation, arguably, dictated that West-
moreland use his limited resources—yes, 
limited resources—to stem the tide 
on the military side at the expense of 
manpower and resources for pacification 
and other nonkinetic programs� Attri-
tion, whether Westmoreland intended 
it or not (Daddis argues not), was the 
public face of his strategic and opera-
tional approach throughout his tenure 
as commander of MACV� If that was 
indeed the case, then Westmoreland’s 
failure is in part one of miscommunicat-
ing what it was he believed he was doing 
in South Vietnam, if not disconnecting 
that belief through intent or ignorance 
from the military reality his forces 
faced, especially from 1966 forward�
Vietnam was not Westmoreland’s war� 
Yes, Westmoreland has been and prob-
ably will continue to be the face of that 
conflict� He is, after all, an easy if not 
agreeable target on which to place a 
great deal of blame for the American 
debacle� However, as Daddis correctly 
points out, the Johnson administration, 
not Westmoreland, placed limitations on 
what Westmoreland could do in Viet-
nam� Political leaders in Washington, 
like the military leader Westmore land, 
eagerly accepted the primacy of Ameri-
can firepower as a military solution to 
both military and political problems in 
South Vietnam� Still, one must accept 
that the officials of the Johnson admin-
istration grounded those limitations in 
deep political earth� At the time, they 
believed they had good reasons for ap-
proaching the conflict the way they did� 
Ultimately, as Daddis suggests, it did not 
matter what those in Washington, Sai-
gon, or MACV did� The war in Vietnam 
was a bad war that American leadership 
believed had to be fought nonetheless, 
resulting in defeat and tragedy that still 
haunts the United States fifty years later�
Westmoreland’s War is an important 
book� Scholars of the conflict should 
read it� Daddis offers thought-provoking 
arguments that counter the Sorley 
school on the Westmoreland years of 
American involvement in Vietnam� 
Whether one agrees with Daddis (or 
Sorley for that matter), diligent scholars 
must consider Daddis’s point of view 
and his interpretation of the archival 
evidence� Daddis has made a valuable 
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contribution to the discussion, just 
as he did with his similarly provoca-
tive No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. 
Army Effectiveness and Progress in the 
Vietnam War (Oxford, 2011). As for 
Westmoreland, the debate continues.
WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON
Hill, Christopher. Outpost: Life on the Frontlines 
of American Diplomacy. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2014. 448pp. $30
An American diplomat for over three 
decades, Christopher Hill’s service 
took him all over the globe and into 
some of the most challenging cir-
cumstances faced by a member of 
the Foreign Service. This account of 
his unique postings during that dy-
namic time frame is a vivid reminder 
of how much the world has changed. 
In his memoir, Outpost: Life on the 
Frontlines of American Diplomacy, Hill, 
now a dean at the Josef Korbel School of 
International Studies at the University 
of Denver, traces his rise in the Depart-
ment of State in a style that is engaging 
and lively. His writing is honest and 
reflective as he recounts his interactions 
with some of the most distinguished 
and most notorious individuals to grace 
the world stage. Over the course of his 
fast-paced narrative, he doesn’t pull any 
punches in his assessments of people or 
policy decisions and, most importantly, 
he shares valuable and candid insights 
(both successes and failures) and lessons 
learned over his distinguished career. 
Prior to his start in the State Depart-
ment, Hill spent two years in the Peace 
Corps. He recalls trying to influence a 
local credit union election in Cameroon 
and failing miserably. He learned the 
folly of trying to change the behavior 
of an entire community. He writes, 
“Years later, in the Middle East, in the 
Balkans, in Asia, I would see time and 
time again systemized efforts on the part 
of the United States to pick winners in 
situations we understood little about. 
Like my efforts at the Tole Tea Estate’s 
credit union, they never worked.”
Another key theme that emerges is the 
importance of mentoring and how it 
enabled Hill to reach his full potential 
in the State Department. His early as-
signments under Lawrence Eagleburger 
(later Secretary of State under George H. 
W. Bush) in Yugoslavia and Richard Hol-
brooke (lead negotiator at the Dayton 
Peace Accords and later ambassador 
to the UN) at the European Bureau 
exposed him to two of the best practitio-
ners of statecraft in the U.S. government. 
After recounting the great success at 
Dayton, Hill transitions his narrative 
to the latter part of his career, in which 
his record as a Foreign Service officer 
is a little more mixed. He describes 
the numerous actors, both domes-
tic (politicians and members of the 
military) and international, that he 
encountered during some of his most 
demanding billets. These postings, 
as the Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, envoy 
to the North Korean nuclear talks for 
the Bush administration, and the U.S. 
ambassador to Iraq for the Obama 
administration, seem to have left Hill 
unfulfilled and somewhat frustrated.
He takes both administrations to task 
for what he believes was an unhealthy 
blend of partisan politics and lack of a 
long-term policy vision. Of particular 
note is Hill’s withering critique of Vice 
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President Cheney and his influence in 
the Bush administration during the Six 
Party Talks� “The neoconservatives, 
aided by a vice president’s office deep 
with suspicions of the Foreign Service, 
seem to believe that the State Depart-
ment negotiated with the North Koreans 
because we enjoyed it� Our effort to ex-
plain � � � fell on deaf ears�” Despite Hill’s 
best efforts, the North Koreans decided 
not to comply with American demands, 
and he was soon brought back home� 
After a short respite, Hill was selected 
to replace Ambassador Ryan Crocker 
in Iraq� He makes many valuable 
observations about his tour in Iraq, 
especially his strained relations with 
the U�S� military leadership responsible 
for the region, in particular Generals 
David Petraeus and Ray Odierno� His 
criticism is also directed at the Obama 
administration, which he perceived as 
slow “to grasp the complexities of the 
region, the seeming confusion within 
its foreign policy team between wars 
of democracy and sectarian enmity�” 
Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of Ameri-
can Diplomacy is a significant contribu-
tion to the international studies field and 
is a must-read� This volume will appeal 
to anyone who is interested in learning 
more about the Department of State or 
the intricacies of American interagency 
relationships� However, with all the 
security challenges facing the United 
States in the foreseeable future, this 
book also needs to be read by midgrade 
and senior military professionals so 
they may gain a better appreciation of 
the Foreign Service and the people who 
serve in that important institution� 
T� J� JOHNSON
Friedberg, Aaron L� Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The 
Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia� London: 
Routledge, 2014� 152pp� $14�99
Normally, a recommendation regarding 
for which audience a book is best suited 
comes at the end of the review� In this 
case, it comes first because Professor 
Aaron Friedberg provides a tight mono-
graph that illuminates areas of great 
misunderstanding to a large population 
in the policy and defense communities: 
the debate over the concept of Air-Sea 
Battle (ASB) and the vernacular of mod-
ern maritime strategy� Landlubbers who 
have been engrossed for the last fourteen 
years in land wars in South Asia should 
read this book� As a history profes-
sor teaching a population composed 
predominantly of U�S� Army majors 
at the Command and General Staff 
College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
this reviewer has firsthand experience 
of this shortfall in knowledge in both 
uniformed and civilian defense person-
nel� The book is also recommended 
to all those who desire a comprehen-
sive discussion of the concept and its 
variations, alternatives, and origins�
Friedberg, a professor of politics and 
international relations at Prince-
ton University, made a compelling 
case in a January 2015 Washington 
Quarterly article about the People’s 
Republic of China’s (PRC’s) “new as-
sertiveness,” which, he argues in this 
book, is the primary motivator for the 
emergence of ASB� From this and his 
other writings, he clearly believes that a 
response to this assertiveness is abso-
lutely necessary, if not overdue, and in 
need of high-profile public debate�
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The monograph is organized into an in-
troduction, four thematic chapters, and 
a concluding chapter, all in about 150 
pages of nicely spaced text—making it a 
comparatively short read, although not a 
simple one� Friedberg first lays out how 
ASB came to be and how the concept is 
defined� Like everyone else, he traces the 
origins of ASB to the challenge present-
ed by the PRC’s adoption of a maritime 
strategy that includes antiaccess/area- 
denial (A2/AD), although when ASB 
emerged it was generically framed and 
could have referred to other coun-
tries, including Iran (see for example 
this reviewer’s “Air-Sea Battle and 
Its Discontents,” USNI Proceedings, 
October 2013)� A2/AD involved the 
expansion of the capabilities of the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy after 
the Taiwan crisis of 1996 to deny use 
of the maritime commons inside the 
so-called first island chain and to chal-
lenge approaches to that area (p� 26)� 
Geographically, the first island chain 
extends from the Japanese archipelago, 
through Taiwan and the Philippines, to 
the exit of the South China Sea (SCS) 
at the Malacca Strait near Singapore� 
China began increasing its surface 
and subsurface fleets and its ability to 
project air power from land bases into 
this region, as well as using innovative 
new weapons such as antiship ballistic 
missiles to threaten U�S� high-value 
units such as aircraft carriers, amphibi-
ous assault ships, and logistics vessels 
beyond the first island chain� Addition-
ally, as A2/AD developed it came to 
represent a “credible threat,” accord-
ing to Friedberg, to the naval and air 
bases and logistics support by U�S� allies 
along the first island chain (pp� 27–28)� 
Friedberg describes this all in detail 
in the introduction and first chapter�
His second chapter then argues that 
the United States responded belat-
edly to A2/AD because of the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 and the 2008 financial 
crisis and great recession� The former 
distracted U�S� policy makers from the 
emerging threat, and the latter pre-
vented a strong response, because of 
the perceived costs in a dismal fiscal 
environment� Evidently he believes the 
current fiscal environment has eased 
enough to take the challenge more 
seriously� Here Friedberg could have 
supported his argument by emphasiz-
ing that, in addition to the economic 
crisis at home, the two wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were consuming inordinate 
U�S� resources in 2008� Nonetheless, he 
does a credible job of debunking those 
critics of ASB who say the A2/AD threat 
is overstated or that the relationship 
between the United States and China has 
improved enough to obviate a response�
Friedberg then outlines in chapter 3 
what can be called the classical ASB con-
cept, calling it the “direct approach�” This 
approach is primarily offensive, although 
it does not posit a U�S� “first strike” but 
rather a reactive counteroffensive that 
threatens the PRC’s land-based power 
projection and naval support to A2/AD 
with commensurate U�S� naval and air 
power, preferably in concert with allies 
such as Japan� He addresses critics by 
examining ASB’s efficacy in the follow-
ing areas (using speculative analysis 
in some cases): military outcomes, 
political outcomes, escalation (including 
nuclear), deterrence value, reassurance 
to allies, and the effects on competition 
between the United States and the PRC� 
Friedberg’s inclusion of nuclear escala-
tory calculus is a welcome component, 
given how little this topic seems to 
be factored into policy discussions in 
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the multipolar nuclear world we now 
inhabit� The Department of Defense 
has an Air-Sea Battle Office, as does 
the U�S� Navy, and his discussion at the 
end of chapter 3 is aimed, presumably, 
at the folks inhabiting those organiza-
tions and their strategic masters� 
Friedberg forecasts two potential ASB 
approaches: a “linear” approach that 
uses existing resources and technol-
ogy and, in contrast, a “discontinuous” 
approach that relies heavily on new 
technologies and un-fielded weapons 
concepts (pp� 95–98)� Friedberg seems 
to prefer the linear approach, given the 
ease with which it can be implemented 
(although that ease does not mean it 
will be inexpensive), but he does not 
rule out investigating new technolo-
gies� He is obviously wary of “betting 
the farm” on a “futures” approach�
In his final chapter, Friedberg describes 
two indirect approaches or “alternatives” 
to ASB: either a distant blockade or 
what he calls “maritime denial” (pp� 104, 
116–17)� He again applies an analytic 
framework to assess the efficacy of these 
less-offensive-oriented approaches� Dis-
tant blockade is merely economic war-
fare� It would aim at Chinese shipping, 
principally oil tankers at the key straits’ 
entrances leading through the SCS to 
Chinese ports� Maritime denial is simply 
ASB limited primarily to the global com-
mons and PRC littoral inside the first is-
land chain� One might characterize mar-
itime denial as an active defense of the 
global commons, but again it is reactive, 
not something to implement without 
significant Chinese military provocation� 
The conclusion reviews the bidding on 
everything discussed� Here Friedberg 
comes across as a bit more bellicose than 
one might expect, implying that a mix 
of all three approaches—ASB, distant 
blockade, and maritime denial—would 
probably be the best course of action� 
Friedberg comes closest to the nub of 
the issue when he writes: “The first 
dividing line in the debate over this issue 
is between the advocates of maritime 
denial, who seek to avoid strikes against 
targets on the Chinese mainland, and 
the proponents of ASB, who believe 
that war cannot be won without such 
attacks” (p� 137)� However, he leaves 
the door open for the reader to make 
up his or her own mind on the issue� 
While this might be perceived as 
strength, it is also something of a disap-
pointment, because this reviewer wanted 
to know what Friedberg really recom-
mends� Friedberg is clearly not of the 
opinion that ASB should be dismissed, 
and seems to support a course of action 
that implies the direct approach option 
while being ready, at a moment’s notice, 
to implement the other two approaches 
in response to a PRC “first strike” (p� 37)�
Friedberg leverages all the latest writing 
on the topic, using the work of writ-
ers familiar to naval audiences such as 
Jan van Tol and Wayne Hughes� He has 
done his homework, and now it is time 
for all others to do theirs as the United 
States faces the A2/AD challenge�
JOHN T� KUEHN
Preble, Christopher, and John Mueller, eds� A 
Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. Na-
tional Security� Washington, D�C�: Cato Institute, 
2014� 224pp� $12�95
Medical doctors are trained to recog-
nize when patients’ complaints and 
self-diagnoses need to be ignored, lest 
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the doctor be responsible for unneces-
sary medical treatment� It is unfortunate 
that we do not have similar education 
for national security officials regarding 
threats to the nation� With such train-
ing, there is a chance we could avoid 
at least some of the overreactions to 
misperceived threats that have bur-
dened recent American foreign policy� 
There is a significant and growing 
literature addressing the issue of threat 
inflation, and Christopher A� Preble and 
John Mueller’s edited volume A Danger-
ous World? is an important contribu-
tion in this area� Published by the Cato 
Institute, it is a collection of sixteen 
essays by an array of authors, each 
delving into a different aspect of the 
U�S� threat environment� Their aim is to 
question the assumptions that underpin 
so much of U�S� national security policy: 
that we live in a perilous world riven 
by uncertainty and threats, and only a 
robust, expensive, and active defense 
preserves the homeland’s security� 
To this end, the work addresses a wide 
range of topics, each examined by a 
different contributor� Francis Gavin 
and John Mueller separately examine 
America’s history of nuclear alarmism, 
noting that predictions of imminent 
explosions in a number of nuclear weap-
ons states have been commonplace for 
decades� Lyle Goldstein argues convinc-
ingly that the threat China poses to the 
United States is a limited one (he uses 
the memorable phrase “panda claws”) 
and he claims China’s rise can be coun-
tered with low-cost strategies� (As of this 
writing, recent devaluations of the yuan 
raise the possibility of a future Chinese 
retrenchment, further reducing the need 
for a potent American counter�) Former 
U�S� intelligence officer Paul Pillar  
explores substate threats (including 
terror groups), asserting that America is 
too quick to seize on new threats� Since 
9/11, more Americans have drowned 
in their bathtubs than have been killed 
in the United States by terrorist attacks, 
and improved security cannot account 
for the entirety of this disparity�
Michael Cohen asks whether other 
aspects of personal welfare, such as 
health security, should also be ad-
dressed in our discussions of security� 
Daniel Drezner explores the economic 
benefits of American military pre-
eminence, and finds them elusive� The 
United States has spent trillions on 
homeland defense and overseas con-
frontations since 9/11, Drezner notes, 
while the total economic impact of 
9/11 itself was “only” $100 billion� 
Elsewhere, Christopher Fettweis exam-
ines the pervasive anxiety in American 
national security culture, arguing that 
“geopolitical fear” has become some-
thing of an American tradition, passed 
on from generation to generation� 
“Wealth creates insecurity in individu-
als, and it seems to do so in states as 
well�” Benjamin Friedman explores the 
issue of threat inflation, arguing that 
America’s vast power “distributes the 
costs” and “concentrates the benefits” 
of confrontational policies, creating 
constituencies that promote (and even 
become dependent on) maintain-
ing a state of unnecessary vigilance�
In many respects, America can afford 
to exaggerate the world’s perils� There 
is no meaningful political pressure to 
reduce the budget of the Department 
of Defense, and America’s national 
security expenditures, large though 
they are, constitute only a fraction of 
the federal budget� At the same time, 
one must also consider the risk that 
threat inflation poses to American 
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lives� More Americans were killed as a 
consequence of the decision to invade 
Iraq in 2003 than on 9/11 itself� But 
there is also the long-term causal impact 
of the U�S� invasion� The existence 
of ISIS is another unintended conse-
quence of the American invasion� 
It is true that there are dangers in this 
world� But Preble and Mueller’s volume 
constitutes an antidote to America’s 
tendency to imagine grave peril, and 
serves as an important counter to the 
American proclivity to overstate the 
benefits and understate the costs of an 
assertive global military posture� The 
editors argue that America is largely 
free of threats that require military 
preparedness or balancing behavior� 
In his chapter, Fettweis argues that 
America’s tendency to exaggerate the 
world’s dangers can be altered, since it is 
based on a system of beliefs that can be 
changed over time� Let’s hope he’s right� 
ANDREW STIGLER
Hassan, Hassan, and Michael Weiss� ISIS: Inside 
the Army of Terror� New York: Regan Arts, 2015� 
288pp� $16�95
The surprising success of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in seiz-
ing control of large parts of northern 
and western Iraq in 2014 has gener-
ated many questions for policy makers 
and the public� How was this group so 
effective so quickly? Where did it come 
from and how did so many observ-
ers miss its rise? What threat does 
ISIS pose to the region and beyond?
Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss ad-
dress these questions in this recent book 
about ISIS� The work is part history of 
the ISIS movement and part analysis 
of its nature and strategy� The authors’ 
backgrounds—Weiss is a prolific 
journalist and Hassan a knowledgeable 
Syrian analyst at the Delma Institute 
in Abu Dhabi—combine brilliantly to 
explain the rapidly evolving events on 
the ground within the context of the 
political-military issues in the region� 
Hassan and Weiss interviewed current 
and former ISIS movement fighters in 
Syria, dissected ISIS propaganda videos 
and statements, and combined other 
scholarly analyses of ISIS to produce 
what I consider to be the most accurate 
assessment of ISIS currently available� 
The overwhelming strength of the book 
is that Hassan and Weiss get the history 
of ISIS right� Although it is often mistak-
enly thought of as a recent phenomenon, 
the authors correctly trace the group’s 
evolution as a core of Salafist-oriented 
fighters who joined together under Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq in 2002–2003� 
Zarqawi’s unique outlook, based in the 
same Salafi-jihadist school as Osama 
Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, imprinted on 
the ISIS movement early and has been 
the biggest factor in the populariza-
tion of its distinct ideology and the 
evolution of its tactics and strategy� The 
authors capture this dynamic, as well as 
ISIS’s subsequent transformation from 
a foreign fighter–based organization 
to a more indigenous Iraqi-led group 
that eventually split with Al Qaeda� 
Because of their understanding of ISIS 
history, Hassan and Weiss are able to 
demonstrate the ideological foundation 
behind ISIS’s strategic targeting and why 
the group takes on such a large spectrum 
of enemies at once� The authors are also 
able to explain ISIS’s genocidal strategy 
and how the group promotes its own 
atrocities to inspire fear in its enemies� 
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This book illuminates the strategic de-
bate over the importance of uncontrolled 
spaces to groups like ISIS� ISIS’s effec-
tive use of low levels of indiscriminate 
violence to take over large parts of Syria 
and Iraq since 2013 demonstrates the 
opportunity that ungoverned space af-
fords malignant actors such as ISIS� The 
ISIS movement began in the Kurdish ar-
eas of Iraq outside the reach of Saddam 
Hussein in 2002, and moved quickly 
into Anbar after identifying a security 
vacuum following the invasion of Iraq in 
2003� The collapse of the Assad govern-
ment in eastern Syria and the defeat of 
the Sunni Awakening militias and their 
Iraqi security partners in several Iraqi 
provinces (2008–12) once again created 
space for the ISIS movement—this time 
to recover from its 2007 defeat in Iraq� 
Despite today’s blistering air campaign, 
ISIS maintains control over most of 
the Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria, and 
arguably continues to develop deep 
roots of support among the population�
The authors also highlight the problems 
of both the Bush and Obama adminis-
trations’ war-termination strategies for 
Iraq, in what has become a recognized 
weakness in the American way of war� 
Comfortable with outsourcing security 
in Sunni areas to an untrained civilian 
militia, both the Iraqis and Americans 
turned a blind eye to the fact that ISIS 
would make the Sunni Awakening an 
important target in order to reestablish 
core sanctuaries inside Iraq� The authors 
point with amazement to the gradual 
release of hard-core ISIS prisoners 
(2008–11) back into their communi-
ties as one of several factors that helped 
fuel the growth of ISIS from its post-
surge nadir� While the reasons for this 
shortsighted approach were undoubt-
edly political and legal in nature, these 
policies surely have contributed to the 
untimely deaths of thousands of Iraqis 
and the loss of much territory to ISIS� 
As of 2015, nineteen of twenty of ISIS’s 
top leaders were formerly in American 
custody at Camp Bucca before being 
released or escaping from custody� 
Overall, I highly recommend this 
book to policy makers, educators, 
and military professionals who seek 
a deeper understanding of the ISIS 
movement� The authors have provided 
a very believable representation of a 
contemporary group that I believe will 
be vindicated by additional research in 
the future� Until that time, this book 
will become the basis for most of our 
understanding of a highly secretive 
and effective pseudostate that remains 
a threat to the region and beyond� 
CRAIG WHITESIDE
Muth, Jörg� Command Culture: Officer Education 
in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 
1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War 
II� Denton: Univ� of North Texas Press, 2013� 
376pp� $29�95
Dr� Jörg Muth has written a serious 
comparative account of the German 
and American precommissioning 
courses and general staff colleges from 
1901 to 1940� Any new work compar-
ing German and American military 
effectiveness in the first half of the 
twentieth century is guaranteed to 
be controversial, and Muth certainly 
achieves controversy� However, there 
exists a significant revisionist school 
of thought that offers an interpreta-
tion much different from Muth’s� 
The May 2010 Society of Military His-
tory annual meeting, held at the Virginia 
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Military Institute, featured a very well-
attended roundtable that posed the 
question of American or German opera-
tional or tactical superiority� The panel 
moderator first asked how many of the 
historians in the room had spent their 
teenage years reading books promot-
ing the vaunted Prussian and German 
militaries� Nearly every hand went up� 
Attracted by the works of Heinz Gude-
rian, F� W� von Mellenthin, Liddell Hart, 
J� F� C� Fuller, and others, many of these 
teenagers grew up to be believers in the 
conventional wisdom that the Germans 
got it pretty well right� A complemen-
tary opinion was that the American 
military forces got very little right� In 
1986, Heller and Stofft’s America’s First 
Battles became the standard history for 
those who found in the German army 
the bravery, intelligence, and aggressive 
leadership they sought for America� 
Muth and this reviewer were both in the 
audience for the 2010 roundtable, and 
both of our hands went up� However, 
the revisionist school, with Michael 
Doubler’s Closing with the Enemy (1994), 
Keith Bonn’s When the Odds Were Even 
(1994), and Peter Mansoor’s GI Offen-
sive in Europe (1999) in the vanguard, is 
alive and well� Perhaps the most useful 
direct discussion of this historiographic 
misalignment was Brian Linn’s piece in 
the Journal of Military History (April 
2002) “The American Way of War Re-
visited” and the comments in response 
by Russell Weigley� Linn’s article and 
Weigley’s response effectively frame the 
distinct difference between interpreta-
tions that hold that the German armed 
forces in both World War I and World 
War II either were superior to the armed 
forces of the United States or were not� 
Muth has significant challenges us-
ing primary and secondary sources� 
He seems to relish his biases, and even 
partly explains those biases in the “Au-
thor’s Afterword,” which Muth states was 
added upon the sage advice of Edward 
M� Coffman and Dennis Showalter� 
Muth’s characterization of U�S� Army  
officers—as people from whom he 
should hide as a youth hanging out with 
American soldiers on maneuvers—may be 
more self-revelatory than Muth realizes�
Muth arguably tries to do too much 
in a single book� His interpretation of 
officer education in both Germany and 
the United States focuses on two levels: 
cadets in their precommissioning pro-
grams and field-grade officers attending 
the equivalent of a general staff college� 
Unfortunately, Muth does little beyond 
making assertions unsupported by 
evidence� These assertions are frequently 
that American army officer education 
was bad, and that the equivalent in Ger-
many was good� He absolutely fails to 
place either education system in its his-
torical context, going so far as to say that 
the word Prussia would be needlessly 
complicating, and that he therefore only 
uses Germany. Muth claims that “school 
solutions” at Leavenworth were “always 
the norm” and that “ineffective courses 
were led by instructors who sometimes 
lacked knowledge of their fields and 
usually failed in didactics and pedagog-
ics�” The only footnote to this paragraph 
refers the reader to Craig Mullaney’s 
Unforgiving Minute about junior officers 
and tactical combat in Afghanistan� No 
other source is cited, except for a vague 
reference to a 2000 West Point graduate� 
This is not an isolated case� There 
are multiple unsubstantiated claims 
throughout the book� For two more 
examples, Muth says nothing of the 
poor reputation of the XI Corps of the 
Army of the Potomac when he asserts 
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that German immigrants made for 
highly respected soldiers in the Ameri-
can Civil War� He also misses the First 
and Second Schleswig-Holstein Wars of 
1848–51 and 1864, respectively, when 
he asserts that in 1866 Prussia had not 
been at war for nearly fifty years� 
Despite these significant shortcom-
ings, this reviewer hopes that Muth 
continues to contribute to both the 
conversation and the controversy�
PETER J� SCHIFFERLE
Philbin, Tobias R� Battle of Dogger Bank: The First 
Dreadnought Engagement. Bloomington: Indiana 
Univ� Press, 2014� 198pp� $32
This title is the latest work from Ameri-
can naval historian Tobias Philbin, who 
is probably best known for his 1982 
biography of Admiral von Hipper� In the 
author’s words, the book is “designed to 
provide new insights into the first battle 
between the largest fighting machines 
of the early twentieth century�” As such, 
one might expect that a detailed analysis 
of the conduct of the battle itself would 
form the heart of the work, with perhaps 
a supporting explanation of the tactics 
employed on both sides and a discus-
sion of whether these were or were not 
in line with prewar expectations� This 
could have been further supported by 
brief chapters explaining the strategic 
situation in the naval war at that point; 
the role of the key personalities; and the 
original thinking behind the develop-
ment of the “fast Dreadnought cruiser” 
as a warship type, insofar as it might 
help explain the platform’s performance 
in the battle itself� The work could then 
have been concluded with a discussion 
on the lessons learned and whether the 
proposed corrective measures were suc-
cessful� In other words, the focus should 
have been clearly on the engagement 
itself and what it vindicated or didn’t�
Sadly, however, and despite good inten-
tions, Philbin falls well short of this aim� 
His coverage of the actual battle is scanty 
and disjointed, and the remainder of 
the work is notably deficient or simply 
inaccurate� This is doubly frustrating 
given that this battle, the first of only 
two dreadnought-versus-dreadnought 
engagements in the entire war, probably 
represented each side’s “last, best chance” 
to put things right, so to speak, before 
the better-known battle of Jutland a year 
later� As such, it is indeed an important 
area for study by the naval historian�
Philbin’s difficulties are threefold� First, 
and as intimated, the balance is arguably 
wrong between the coverage of the battle 
itself and the supporting text� He devotes 
only 30 of the 150 or so pages to actual 
analysis of the battle, with the remaining 
pages dealing with the supporting areas� 
Unfortunately, these 30 pages, more than 
many others, fall victim to the second 
difficulty he has, which is in developing 
a clear and coherent narrative of a series 
of events, free from repetition and diver-
sion� Rather than recounting the main 
features of the engagement in a chrono-
logical fashion, he chooses to take the 
different perspectives of the individual 
ships involved, which does not help the 
reader elucidate the decision making as 
it might have appeared to the oppos-
ing fleet commanders at the time—a 
feature central to his stated aim—and 
leads to a nonsequential presentation of 
the main events� None of this is helped 
by the maps in the book that, although 
reproductions of the original battle 
reports and histories, are almost unread-
able in the scale presented� Thus, despite 
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being fairly familiar with the overall 
engagement, I found myself resort-
ing to Wikipedia for a quick reminder 
and sanity check� Repetition is also rife 
throughout the book, sometimes in 
successive paragraphs, pages, and even 
endnotes, which makes the reader’s 
journey more laborious than it need be� 
The real worry, though, is his third 
difficulty: that of accuracy and the 
incorporation of a comprehensive cover-
age of the relevant scholarship� On the 
accuracy side, some of the construction 
dates for the ships involved are incor-
rect, even according to the sources that 
he does use; he cites the wrong Lambert 
in the text on page 6; on page 24, he 
claims Dogger was the first “battle” in 
the Anglo-German naval race when it 
was, of course, the first dreadnought 
engagement; while on page 27 he has 
HMS Vernon as “the gunnery school for 
the Royal Navy,” when it was actually 
HMS Excellent� To make matters worse 
in the context, Admiral John “Jacky” 
Fisher was of course closely associated 
with both of these establishments, albeit 
at different points in his career� In addi-
tion, and while not as specific, there are 
all sorts of other, more general omis-
sions and inaccuracies in the presenta-
tion of the powder vulnerabilities, the 
ammunition and gunnery practices in 
use, and the train of thought that led to 
the all-big-gun ordnance, all of which 
could have been corrected by reference 
to some of the more current scholar-
ship from the likes of Jon Sumida, John 
Brooks, and Norman Friedman� Perhaps 
most importantly, though, and given 
that the author attempted to cover the 
origins of the battle cruiser type in his 
second chapter, it was disappointing to 
find Admiral Fisher’s role in the whole 
debate minimized, and the relationship 
between the true dreadnought and its 
battle cruiser variant simplified to an 
unrealistic degree� This is no trivial mat-
ter, because, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the fact that the battle cruiser was essen-
tially performing in a role that had not 
been originally envisioned by its creators 
goes a long way toward explaining the 
very mixed results these ships achieved� 
Once again, this could have been better 
represented with a more searching inclu-
sion of some of the more cutting-edge 
findings from Sumida, Nicolas Lam-
bert, Matthew Seligmann, and others�
In sum, this book will probably dis-
appoint the serious historian of the 
period� It does gather together in one 
place a host of interesting and related 
facts about the battle and its par-
ticipants� Given that these can form 
useful “points of departure” for future 
work in this area, as well as inform-
ing and inspiring the amateur naval 
enthusiast, all is not lost� But the book 
could have been so much more� 
ANGUS ROSS
Huang, Chun-chieh� Taiwan in Transformation: 
Retrospect and Prospect� 2nd ed� New Brunswick, 
N�J�: Transaction, 2014� 233pp� $52�95
As a native Taiwanese deeply steeped 
in Chinese historical and philosophical 
sources, Chun-chieh Huang adds dimen-
sions that are less emphasized in many 
other perceptive books on contemporary 
Taiwan� A prolific scholar of treatises on 
Confucian thought, Huang believes that 
Taiwan can bring much to contempo-
rary Confucian thinking, since Taiwan 
interprets the world through a lens of 
contemporary and vibrant democracy—
as opposed to China’s legacy of the 
Cultural Revolution and party control� 
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In fact, he asserts that Taiwan can help 
lead China’s Confucian revival as the 
gem in the crown of Confucian thinking�
The book is divided into approximately 
equal sections of retrospect and pros-
pect, indicating the relative importance 
that the author gives to understanding 
the past as a foundation for understand-
ing the present and the future� Before 
Huang explores the individual and social 
psychology of what it means to be a 
“New Taiwanese,” he reviews the under-
lying nostalgia that almost all ethnically 
Chinese people, including those resident 
on Taiwan, have for cultural China� 
This is a powerful shared emotion that 
has ramifications for contemporary 
cross-strait politics� Colonized by the 
Japanese between 1895 and 1945, the 
Taiwanese suffered second-class Chinese 
citizenship and were labeled spies and 
collaborators by their ethnically similar 
mainland Chinese counterparts� Aside 
from this broad-based cultural discrimi-
nation, the millions of Taiwanese were 
then also repressed politically on the 
island by the million or so Nationalists 
who came to Taiwan after World War 
II, first to set up a provincial govern-
ment to replace the Japanese occupying 
government, then to set up the Repub-
lic of China Nationalist government 
at the end of the Chinese civil war� 
The book recaps key eras in Taiwan’s 
history, including the populating of the 
island by Haklo from Fujian Province, 
Hakka from Guangdong Province, the 
Dutch (1624–61), Koxinga and the Ming 
loyalists (1661–83), the Qing (1683–
1895), and the Japanese (1895–1945)� 
Huang points out that the Chinese are 
“Homo historicus” most clearly, and 
that all ways forward must take into 
account the patterns and details of the 
past when considering the future�
According to Huang, Taiwan’s path 
forward in cross-strait relations lies 
between those extremes of citizens who 
in 2013 favored quick integration (3 
percent) and those who favored quick 
independence (7�2 percent)� He recom-
mends a necessary long-term steady 
dialogue examining and reconciling the 
mutual histories of Taiwan and main-
land China� That is to say, Huang is not a 
proponent of maintaining the status quo 
but seeks a Confucian “middle way”: 
carefully and compassionately forging 
an increasing reconciliation over time� 
Using a metaphor from literature, he 
posits that Taiwan is an orphan trying 
to reconcile with its parent� The pathos 
of the scenario is lessening because the 
orphan has had great success, but never-
theless there is a core of Chinese identity 
that still remains to be reconciled with 
the ever-emerging Taiwanese identity� 
Although, as noted, Huang is a native 
observer of the Taiwanese scene, the 
book is gracefully written in fluid, clear 
English� It is useful as core reading for 
undergraduate and graduate courses on 
Taiwan, as well as for readers seeking 
to deepen their knowledge of East Asia� 
It also provides context that should be 
considered when thinking about U�S� 
policy in the Asia-Pacific region� 
GRANT F� RHODE
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